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
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EC Nine Considers Actions to Counter Arab
Moves in the UN Against Israel

Western leaders will hold private discussions in Helsinki this week on developing a strategy to deal with Arab efforts against Israel in the UN. The EC Nine are also concerned by the issue and the political directors are meeting in Helsinki tomorrow to work out a plan of action.

The Italians, who are serving a six-month stint in the EC Presidency, were asked by Washington last week to inquire whether the EC Nine--individually and collectively--might try to persuade the nonaligned states, at their meeting next month, not to adopt a resolution demanding Israeli ouster. The Italians had earlier recommended that the EC hold further consultations prior to the opening of the UN General Assembly. They have now instructed their embassies in eighty capitals to make representations on behalf of the EC, stressing the Community's firm adherence to the principle of universality in the UN.

President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt agree that formal demarches to the Arabs--either by the EC or by individual members--would be counter-productive at this time. A top Quai official told the US embassy this week that public exchanges on this issue were not helpful and might provoke the Arabs into pressing the campaign with greater vigor. He said that a way must be found to enable Arab moderates to convince the more radical members that the matter can be dropped without losing face.

Bonn realizes it could not simply accept a vote against Israel and then go back to business as usual in the General Assembly. Paris--which has taken the

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lead among EC members in attempting to dissuade the Arabs--would certainly also be put on the spot by an anti-Israel vote. French officials, however, are inclined to counsel Israeli concessions in order to defuse the Arab campaign.

Both Paris and Bonn intend, as a first priority, to try to obtain a Community agreement to take quiet but persuasive action in those capitals where it might be most effective. EC Nine embassies in selected Arab, nonaligned and African capitals would be instructed to engage in informal discussions emphasizing the extensive damage that would be done to EC-Arab relations, the UN, and to the Arab cause itself. Bonn is prepared to take unilateral action should the Community be slow to act.

Luxembourg Prime Minister Thorn is also pushing for a concerted EC effort. As the next UN General Assembly President, he is prepared to use his influence to oppose suspension efforts, but he wants to maintain an appearance of objectivity and thus rules out bilateral approaches to the Arabs and nonaligned countries.

Danish Foreign Minister Andersen, on the other hand, thinks his government would make formal demarches to certain countries in advance of the nonaligned conference. He has spoken personally with the Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, Soviet, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Romanian ambassadors and thinks he got across the inference that Denmark might withdraw from the UN should a strong anti-Israel resolution be adopted.

Giscard proposed, and Schmidt agreed, that the Israel-UN matter be included on the agenda of the Quadripartite luncheon in Helsinki on July 31. London also expects planning for either concerted or individual action to be taken up in the Finnish capital. The Canadian Ministry of External Affairs has suggested that Prime Minister Trudeau raise the question at the summit, presumably in an appropriate private forum.

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
Tel Aviv, for its part, is sending a top government official to Finland, reportedly to sound out the participants regarding the anti-Israel efforts.



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
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Ottawa to Support US Position on Possible
Expulsion of Israel From UN

Canada shares the US' concern over Arab moves to oust Israel from the UN and is willing to help in a campaign to inform other members of this concern.

An official of the Ministry of External Affairs told US embassy officers that he would consult External Affairs Minister MacEachen or the Under-secretary about the matter and have a firm proposal ready within two or three days. He believed Canada would have considerable influence with less developed Commonwealth countries and might also be able to persuade some French African states. He also felt his government would probably prefer to make bilateral approaches rather than join in a multilateral effort.

The official cautioned against an overly aggressive campaign in support of Israel which he said would be counterproductive and play into the hands of the more extreme non-aligned countries.

A telegram to Prime Minister Trudeau suggesting that he raise the Israel UN expulsion issue at the Helsinki summit meeting is being prepared by the Ministry of External Affairs, according to another official. 

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West German Support for US Military Presence
Remains Strong

One of the favorite topics of speculation in recent years has been whether Ostpolitik and detente in general would erode the West German public's support for the continued presence of US troops. A poll conducted this spring by Emnid, a reputable polling institute, suggests there has been a decline in such support, but that it has been slight.

The results indicate that a broad consensus exists among the non-Communist parties on the important role played by US troops in maintaining peace in Europe and the need to retain them in West Germany. More significantly, young age groups feel just about the same as the older generation on these issues.

On the question of the importance of US troops for West Germany's security, the respondents expressing doubt rose gradually from 18 percent in 1970 to 29 percent this year. However, the percentage expressing a positive conviction is about the same--70 percent--as in 1970, and is slightly up from 1972 when only 65 percent expressed such a view.

West Germans are more inclined than before to view the US troops as beneficial to both Washington and Bonn. The percentage expressing this feeling has risen from 50 to 55 percent in the last five years. This development largely reflects a decline in the number of West Germans who believe that the US military presence is designed primarily to serve the interests of the

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Federal Republic. The percentage expressing the latter view dropped from 24 percent to 18 percent during the same time period.

Proposals to withdraw US troops from West Germany still elicit a strong negative reaction. Of the respondents, 67 percent are opposed compared to 60 percent five years ago. Those favoring either a full or partial withdrawal of US troops has fluctuated between 20 and 30 percent; the poll this year showed 27 percent favoring such a proposal.

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